With conflict arising in midst of Middle-East, things have totally gone downhill. What they apprehended wasn’t always uplifting. The center East is gripped by the worst upheaval in the ensuing decades, with the year-round protests engulfing and threatening the hegemony of Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq; the political transitions in the lateral countries of Algeria and the old state of Sudan looked in a horrendous conflict of Interest; civil wars in the country like Libya, Yemen, and Syria; and regional conflicts between the Gulf states against Iran and Turkey against the Kurds have seen some colossal problems and at their disposal and have witness nadir or worst phase, since things went wrong in the last decade. At a point when the U.S. wants to be less involved within the region due to its conflict with the differing ideologies (mainly Shia and Sunni) in a packed country of Iran and, its local brother in arms (and fated adversaries) that are enjoining more amount of attention that they ever contrived to get the hand.
The U.S. has sought a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, which has mostly succeeded in crushing the Iranian economy. However, it’s neither constrained Iran to return to the negotiating table nor curtailed its “malign” regional activities, which have increased. The Trump administration has had a measured response to hostile Iranian actions, indicating a desire to avoid an immediate war. The USA’s hostile act of killing Qasem Soleimani has already provoked Iran and brought the situation to a near conflict of turning things into World war. The slain hero of Iran was the most celebrated figure in the country, and there was seen widespread condemnation of white house and Trump administration for their actions.
With things getting out of hand since then Iran seems bent drawing a line only at the evidence of Iranian responsibility for the killing of USA citizens, leaving wide latitude for Iran to work against U.S. interests without worrying of a U.S. military response which was hard on its heels.
Iran sensed that the “maximum pressure” campaign against them has primarily bottomed out and can’t do much further destruction, feels emboldened to extend its influence ventures regionally and attack at the rivals that have disrupted its economy and have side-lined it from the major fronts.
9/11 was a pivotal warning call for the UAE. Two of the 19 hijackers were Emirati. The attacks led to a severe policy shift, both domestically and internationally, because the Emiratis sought to reform their ostentatious society and limit the influence of the Islamism regionally. Adding more flares in the conflicted region of Middle-East.
Domestically, post-9/11, the Emirates launched an education initiative to get rid of Islamist teachers from schools and reorient towards international education standards. The country is predominantly concerned with providing jobs to the subsequent generation, which it feels is that the best thanks to preventing youth from joining extremist groups.
Concerning policy, of the Emirates in the Middle-East, were the primary country to chop ties with the Taliban after 9/11, and, within the wake of the Arab Spring, is decided to limit the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood within the region. The UAE’s vision of a “more stable, moderate region” is based on elevating and protecting marginalized religious communities instead of supporting those seeking the downfall of authoritarian governments through mass protest.
UAE in its latest stance has tied his knots with Israel, ending a rift that was up in the open since the time the Mediterranean country won the 6-day war against UAE, and its allies back in 1967. With both the states establishing consulates in each other countries, there is still a need for clarity on this sudden change of heart, which have drawn upon criticisms from OIC and other Arab countries.
Iraq is fortunate to possess responsible political leaders in power, but the govt has proven ineffective in providing services. After numerous years of international intervention in its politics, the Iraqi people are not any longer focused on foreign relations, but only bread-and-butter domestic concerns.
The country suffers from three main problems. The first, within the short-term, is that the Islamic State. Though the terrorist organization does not control territory, it’s by no means defeated, with insurgent capabilities and a robust intelligence network. Iraq is torn equally between Iranian and U.S. influence.
In the medium term, Iraq is faced with continuous meddling from Iran, which controls both militia groups and far of the country’s bureaucracy. However, Iran doesn’t “own” Iraq—the country is torn equally between Iranian and U.S. influence. In the future, Iraq must improve its economy, which suffers from a socialist, statist mentality which fears foreign investment as outside “domination.” It earns an equivalent oil revenue as Kuwait, but with 40 times the population. In short, it’s a reinter state that can’t afford to be one.
The Saudi-led campaign in Yemen began in back in the year of 2015 with three objectives insight in the Middle-East: restore the internationally-recognized Yemeni government led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi; deter Iran from further interference within the Arabian Peninsula, and eradicate the Houthi threat on its border. Altogether three respects, the campaign has failed. But they failed in their conquest and still are lukewarm the situation. The other half of the ideology of Iran and it’s the sheer opposing counterpart, Saudi Arabia was in continuous criticism regarding its role in giving an extra hand to the Houthis in Yemen. They were aiding them with the arms and blackbucks in their fight with the Government, thus causing some severe conundrums for the Yemen Govt. Involvement of Saudi Arabia in the turmoil of Yemen has not relived anyone but piled up more pain in the Saga.
This summer, the UAE announced that it had been drawing down forces in Yemen, presumably in response to increased Iranian hostility within the Gulf. The drawdown surprised Saudi Arabia in the Middle-East, as long as the UAE led the majority of anti-Houthi army in Yemen. The drawdown may, therefore, function a catalyst for increased cooperation with UN-led mediation, whilst it threatens to tear apart the pro-government faction apart between the northern federalists and southern secessionists.
Both the mercenary organization of al Qaeda and therefore the Islamic State with its roots in Yemen remain potent and on the verge of loosening out, if not in size, then in the more exclusive technological proficiencies. Meanwhile, the United States’ war on the terrorism in Yemen has bred success against both al Qaeda and Islamic State factions, mostly thanks to UAE-led militias leveraging native Yemenis to discourage tribal cooperation with the fear groups. However, both al Qaeda and therefore the Islamic State in Yemen remain potent, if not in size, then in technological capability.
Turkey, Kurds, and Syria
The Kurds were the sole partner willing and capable enough to fight the Islamic State in Syria. The U.S. was equipped to liberate the whole territory with only a limited number of casualties, while the Kurds suffered 11,000 losses.
The administration tried to plan a “safe zone” on the Turkish-Syrian border to appease Turkish President Erdoğan and had already started the method when the White House announced its pullout. The administration didn’t fundamentally see the withdrawal as a “green light” to Erdogan, but a sign that Turkey was now working on its own intelligence, without the U.S. support. The administration of Erdogan expected that the threat of sanctions would be a sufficient deterrent to Turkey.
In the long-term prospects, the U.S. goal in the middle-east country of Syria is stabilization, particularly in areas liberated from the Islamic State. The U.S. will maintain its military presence within the country and has substantial ties to humanitarian aid groups. Within the interim, the Assad regime—and the Russian Government—should be held liable for the much anticipated chemical weapons attacks and also work on preventing from mass civilian slaughter in Idlib, the last remaining rebel stronghold.
With the dire picture still not clear and it’s accumulated upon the imagination, above reflecting the strenuous state of the territorial grounds, the trip was book-ended by the signs of some real hope that may save them from the ominous situation. It began by bringing things in the limelight, focusing on the role that indigenous art which could play in the peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and inducing marginalized voices to the fore. And therefore the final day concluded with an interpretation that the present millennial generation of the Arabs and other somewhat relevant locals who found themselves amidst the numerous significant chaos that world has ever seen—more connected, empowered, and engaged than ever before—could indeed herald a transformation within the trajectory of the Centre East of the middle-east.
In the next Post we’ll see separately about each country of the middle-east, as what has engulfed these countries into a major rift.